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On a blustery June afternoon in 1616, an angry King
James summoned the Judges of Kings Bench to his palace.
Furious that the Judges had decided a case on which he had
instructed them to withhold judgment, the King denounced
the Judges for their unseemly conduct. It was, he exploded,
treason. At that, the Judges fell to their knees and begged his
forgiveness. As the Judges cowered at his feet, James asked
each in turn what he would do if the King ever again told the
Court to withhold its judgment. Each replied that he would
do as his King commanded. When at last the King fixed his
cold eyes on Lord Chief Justice Coke and asked him what he
would do, the trembling Chief Justice lifted his head to his
King and whispered: "I should do that which would be fit for
a judge to do."'
The courage of Coke's reply cost him the Chief Justiceship. Its ambiguity saved his head. Time has vindicated
Coke's courage. We are justly proved of an independent judiciary which has so recently demonstrated that even the Presi* Prof. Wake Forest University School of Law; A.B., LL.B., LL.M. Harvard,

1971; S.J.D. Univ. of Va.
1. C. BOWEN, 3 THE LION AND THE THRONE 370-74 (1956).
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dent rules under-and not above-the law. Time has not clarified the ambiguity, however. Precisely what 'tis fit for a judge
to do-particularly a Justice of the Supreme Court-remains
a perplexing question.
Ours is, afterall, a democratic republic in which power
flows from the people to elected representatives who remain
answerable to the people. By contrast, the Justices sit for life
and answer to no one. The Court is thus a profoundly antidemocratic institution. When and how the Court ought to exercise its anti-democratic authority is the only enduring important question in American constitutional law.
I am not saying that it is the only important question in
constitutional law. At any given time, questions about the
substantive meaning of specific constitutional provisions may
be very important. In the 1920's and 30's, for example, we
worried about the meaning of the commerce clause. When-if
ever-could Congress protect the welfare of the people
through its power to regulate interstate commerce? 2 In the
1940's and 50's, we worried about the meaning of the First
Amendment. When-if ever-could the cop tell us to shut up
or move on?s In the 1960's and 70's, we worried about the
meaning of the equal protection clause. When-if ever-could
the state treat blacks, women, children, aliens or gays differently? 4 What we will worry about in the 1980's and 90's is not
clear to me, for I am no clairvoyant and have no crystal ball in
which I read the future. Perhaps a "Reaganized" Court under
Chief Justice William Rehnquist will make the meaning of the
ninth amendment the most important substantive question in
constitutional law.5
But whatever substantive question dominates constitutional litigation in the coming decades, a recurring concern
will be whether the Court, in answering the substantive question, has acted within its constitutional authority. In the
2. See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 19331946, 59 HAsv. L. R.v. 645 (1946).
3. See generally Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From
Schenck to Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 41.
4. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
5. E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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1930's, for example, President Roosevelt excoriated the Court
for its "horse and buggy" interpretations of the Constitution.'
The conservative Justices were seen as judicial Neros, content
to fiddle Constitutional text and precedent while the country
burned. Thirty years later, the Court was excoriated for its
progressive interpretations of the Constitution, and impeach
EarlWarren billboards dotted the highways.7 In both instances, critics accused the Court of usurping legislative
power. The distinguished Oxford Don H.L.A. Hart has written
that "American jurisprudence...

is marked by a concentra-

tion, almost to the point of obsession, on the judicial process,
that is, with what courts do and should do, how judges reason
and should reason in deciding particular cases."
What is it fit for a judge to do? At the outset, we can
identify two popular polar answers to that question. I call
these the "impossible dream" and the "recurrent nightmare."
According to the first answer, the judge should determine the
meaning of the clause in question by reading the language of
the clause. That might be possible in "the lawyer's paradise
where," according to James Bradley Thayer, "all words have a
fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; .. .where a lawyer may
sit in his chair, inspect the document referred to him, and answer all questions without raising his eyes." 9 Justice Roberts
once described his job as if he lived in that lawyer's paradise:
"I lay the statute in question next to the Constitutional provision and see if the former squares with the latter." 10 If Justice
Roberts were the only Justice ever to have expressed this
view, we might dismiss it as the simple opinion of an unsophisticated Justice who once grumbled to a friend: "It's not
my fault I'm not a Holmes or a Brandeis." But the late Justice Black, one of the most influential Justices of this century,
agreed with Justice Roberts. In his famous television interview, he was asked how he decided cases. Pulling out his dog6. M. PuSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 5 (1937).
7. See, e.g., J. CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973).

8. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, 11 G. L. Ruv. 969 (1977).
9. Quoted in J. Bond & C. Rose, Introduction to Legal Skills 208 (1978) (unpublished materials).
10. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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eared copy of the Constitution, he said: "I look here until I
find the answer.'"

With all due respect to these gentlemen, the view that
judges can determine meaning from language alone is self-evident nonsense-an "impossible dream." Admittedly, the
meaning of a few Constitutional clauses is apparent from their
language. I can't imagine anyone arguing about the meaning
of the clause which says that each state shall have two senators. The fact that one of our present senators is dubbed the
senator from Boeing is, I assume, political rhetoric and not a
serious argument that every major defense contractor is entitled to its own senator. Similarly, the clause which says that
the President must be a natural born citizen is clear. Presumably, no one would argue that "natural born" excludes one delivered by Caesarean section.
Cases involving the meaning of such clauses do not crowd
the Court docket. Typically, the Court must decide the meaning of clauses whose language is much less specific and clear.
The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not specify the circumstances in
which a search or seizure becomes unreasonable. The sixth
amendment, which guarantees the accused the assistance of
counsel, does not specify the circumstances under which the
accused is entitled to that assistance. The due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not specify what
process is, in fact, due. The equal protection clause does not
specify those classifications which violate its command. The
language of these clauses is simply not dispositive of cases
arising thereunder.
This very lack of specificity and clarity has caused some
to argue that the judge can therefore give any meaning he
wishes to the clause in question. In this view, the Constitution
is an empty bottle into which the Court may pour whatever
meaning it wishes. Bishop Hoadly gave this view its classic
statement when he declared: "He who hath the power to interpret the law is truly the lawgiver." While there is much
wisdom in the Bishop's dictum, I call this view "the recurrent
11. Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 937, 938 (1977) (reprinted from a CBS News Special of Dec. 3, 1968).
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nightmare." Its implications are frightening. After all, the
only justification for the extraordinary discretion which the
Court exercises is the belief that its discretion is circumscribed by the law. If that belief be mere myth, then the Justices' discretion is circumscribed only by political realities-and the Justices may decide the meaning of the
Constitution on the basis of whim, passion, prejudice-or, if
they are in a sporting mood-by the flip of a coin.
Although critics (and dissenting Justices) often berate the
Court majority for reading its whims, passions, and prejudices
into the Constitution, most Justices do not exercise their authority capriciously. Language is not infinitely malleable.
Judges must still give reasons supporting their decisions. The
profession may-and does-critique their opinions. Among
the modern Justices, I think only Justice Douglas decided
cases solely on the basis of his personal predilections. In reviewing his autobiography, I said (perhaps too harshly) that
the United States Reports recorded only his enthusiasms for
every liberal cause from free speech to free abortion.12 In fairness to the Justice, he insisted that he worked out decisions
like any other judge, and he may well have believed that. Near
the end of his life, Justice Douglas articulated yet another basis for deciding cases. A former law clerk, trying to convince
the ailing Justice to resign, pointed out that he couldn't even
read anymore. "How are you going to know how to vote?" the
former law clerk asked. Justice Douglas replied: "I'll listen
and see how the Chief votes, and [then I'll] vote the other
way... ."Is Spunky-if not principled-to the end.
If the dream is fanciful and the nightmare imagined, what
is the real choice? The real choice is between looking backward for guidance or looking forward for inspiration, between
deciding as a craftsman or deciding as a statesman. The
craftsman must necessarily look backward-to the purposes of
the framers and to the historical experiences of the American
people. His is a search for the values eminent in the text and
12. Bond, Book Review,

-

Dzr. C. L. REv, -

().

Cf. Baude, An Appreciative Note on Mr. Justice Douglas' View of the Court's Role
in Environmental Cases, 51 IND. L. J. 22 (1975).
13. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETRUEN 391 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG].
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our history. He then decides the question before him in light
of those purposes and values. Judicial craftsmanship is thus
the art of deciding a legal dispute on the basis of a reasoned
judgment in which the judge applies legal principles to specific facts. The craftsman cares most about the process, confident that the correct result will follow if he reasons soundly.
By contrast, judicial statesmanship is the process by
which the judge wisely and shrewdly manages public affairs
through the resolution of legal disputes. The judicial statesman must necessarily look forward for inspiration because he
must anticipate the future and fashion a solution for its predicted problems. The judicial statesman thus focuses primarily on the result. Is it wise, just or fair? Process remains important to the statesman. He asks himself: did I seize the
right time, and did I move the law as far but no further than
the community would tolerate? The bottom line, however, is
that any process is acceptable so long as it produces the desired result.
In contemporary writing about the Court, the craftsman
is denigrated, the statesman is celebrated. Yale Professor
Walter Wade Hamilton contemptuously dismissed Justice
Frankfurter, a consummate craftsman, as at his best when
knitting legal crochet on the fingers of the case. Alas, the Justice had no instinct, the professor added, for "the moral jugular of the case." 1 ' By contrast, Chief Justice Earl Warren, we
are told, had an unerring instinct for the moral jugular of the
case. The most lavishly praised Chief since John Marshall,
Warren, according to his biographer, "functioned on the Court
much as he had as governor, identifying needed reforms."1
Warren, the consummate judicial statesman, acted from "his
instinct for what was fair, honorable, politically feasible and
sensible at the time."1 O
The former Attorney General of the United States, Ramsey Clark, insists that we desperately need judicial statesmen
like Warren. "The major question of our times," explains Mr.
Clark,
14. Id.
15. G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A Pmurc Lwz 369 (1982).

16. Id.
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is whether institutions can change to cope with the vast dynamics of mass urban population and burgeoning technology
. . . .All institutions must address themselves as their first
priority to the science of effective change if we are to meet
the challenge of tomorrow. The United States Supreme
Court has addressed itself to... the1 7future more effectively
than any other agent of our society.
In spite of these and similar paeans of praise for judicial
statesmanship, I remain skeptical. Indeed, I want to identify
four major perils of judicial statesmanship. First, and most
obviously, the Court may decide erroneously. Second, the
Court may generate rather than resolve controversy. Third,
the Court may forsake its special responsibility to protect individual liberty. Finally, fourth, and most important, the
Court may undermine the rule of law. Let me explain each of
these perils in detail.
Peril #1: Error. The court may decide erroneously. The
risk of error inheres in all decision-making, of course; but
judges who insist on acting as statesmen run a very high risk
of making a mistake. The future is, afterall, notoriously difficult to predict. The Court has certainly shown little gift for
accurate prediction. Listen to Justice Miller, writing for the
Court in the Slaughterhouse Cases:"s "We doubt very much
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against Negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of [the fourteenth amendment]."" e Listen to Justice Bradley, writing for
the Court in Bradwell v. Illinois,20 dubbed the "she-lawyer"
case by the press because it involved a woman's complaint
that Illinois would not license her to practice law: "The natural and proper timidity and delicacy [of] the female sex evidently unfits [her] for many of the occupations of civil life....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fill the
''
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. 12
17. S.ERVIN

& R.

CLARK, ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: POLICYMAKER OR AnjuDi-

CATION26-27 (1970).
18. Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
19. Id. at 81.
20. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
21. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J. Concurring).
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Although Justices Miller and Bradley were probably the two
most able judges on the post-Civil War Court, they badly misread the future-as did Holmes fifty years later when he flipas "the usual last
pantly dismissed an equal protection claim
22
resort of all constitutional arguments.

There are two specific institutional reasons why a Court
which attempts to devise a statesmanlike solution will likely
err. One, the Court can't get all the facts which it needs. Two,
the Court can't balance competing interests sensitively
enough. Appellate courts must accept the facts as found below, and the facts thus found are limited to those deemed relevant to the particular dispute at trial. The Supreme Court
may not conduct an independent inquiry into the underlying
facts. The Justices themselves are not experts. Briefs are not a
substitute for legislative hearings, and clerks are not a substitute for professional staffs.
The Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States23 illustrates how both tradition and procedure prevent the court
from getting all the facts which it needs. In that case the
plaintiff, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, challenged
the government's right to take him from his home and move
him inland to a relocation center. The government contended
that wartime conditions required relocation. It feared a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. It feared further that American citizens of Japanese ancestry would aid the invaders.
Resolving these competing claims required access to facts not
easily acquired. How great was the danger of invasion? Were
American citizens of Japanese ancestry likely to commit treason? Could those most likely to commit treason be identified
through a brief hearing process? If American citizens had to
be detained, were their property and other interests at least
protected?
The facts, as we know them today, underscore the Court's
error in sustaining the relocation plan.24 Officials within the
government disagreed sharply about the probability of invasion and the likelihood of fifth column sabatoge of Japanese22. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
23. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. See generally Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster,54 YALE
L. J. 489 (1945).
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Americans. The Court, however, was never apprised of these
disagreements. We do know that the British handled the
whole problem efficiently and fairly through an expedited
hearing process. As a result most British citizens of German,
Italian, or Japanese ancestry lived through the war years like
all other British citizens.
Even if the Court could find the facts necessary to make
an informed decision, it cannot usually shape that decision to
the satisfaction of competing interest groups. Compromise,
the hallmark of the legislative process, is not the distinguishing characteristic of the judicial process. In a court, one side
loses and one side wins. Moreover, the Court is our least representative public institution. Lawyers all, the Justices are
old, successful, well-heeled, and, with one exception to date,
men. It strains credulity to believe that such persons would
tingle with sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of diverse
groups. Indeed, the Justices quite properly reject the notion
that they represent particular interest groups. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the second flag salute case, said:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms
guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal
attitude relevant I should whole heartedly associate myself
with the general libertarian views of the Court's opinion,

representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime.
But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic ....
As a member of this Court I am not
justified in writing my private notions of policy into the
Constitution, no matter how deeply I cherish them or how

mischievous I may deem their disregard."'
In short, the Supreme Court conference room is not a third
house of Congress, despite the common-and I think unfortunate-habit of referring to a Jewish seat, or the woman's seat,
or even, God forgive me, the scholar's seat. Moreover, the
bench is not a bully pulpit from which the Chief Justice can
summon us to a moral crusade.
Peril #2: Divisiveness. The Court's attempt to impose a
25. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-47
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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statesmanlike solution may generate rather than resolve controversy. Again, the nature of the judicial process prevents the
Court from dictating any final solution. In the first place, the
Court cannot impose comprehensive solutions. In the second
place, its imposed solutions do not command the acquiescence
given those solutions hammered out in the political process.
For strategic reasons, most plaintiffs raise the narrowest
claim possible. Even though the plaintiff's claim may be but
part of a far larger problem the Court may usually anwer only
plaintiff's claim and cannot address the larger problem. Plyler
v. Doe,'2 6 the alien schoolchild case decided last term, illustrates my point. Few problems are as complex as the presence
of illegal aliens in this country. Unless we wish to build a
2,000 mile long Berlin Wall along our southern border, we
cannot seal off the flood of Mexicans into the Southwest. The
police could not mount a serious effort to deport those already
illegally present without spending a lot of money and using
many questionable enforcement tactics. A successful deportation program would disrupt the Mexican economy, which
could not support the newly returned workers, and the economy of those states that have come to depend on the illegal
alien for cheap labor. At the same time, many specific burdens
of dealing with the illegal alien fall disproportionately on particular communities which have neither the resources nor the
power to deal with the larger problem. Understandably, the
national government has struggled for years to develop a coherent policy.
Whether the children of aliens illegally present in this
country are entitled to attend public schools free is but a
small part of the larger problem. In Plyler, the Court ordered
communities to open their schoolhouse doors to alien children
illegally present there. It naturally refused to address the
question whether these children were entitled to other community welfare services. It also refused to address the question whether their parents were entitled to all services and
benefits extended resident aliens or citizens. In trying to answer only one aspect of the larger problem, the Court may
nevertheless have opened a Pandora's Box because the appar26. 50 U.S.L.W. 4650 (U.S. June 15, 1982) (No. 80-1538).
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ent principle upon which it rested its decision that these children had a right to attend our schools is not easily limited.
Whether aliens illegally present in this country should be
treated like aliens lawfully present or like citizens is for Congress and Congress alone to say. Whatever may ultimately be
said for a policy of treating illegally present aliens like resident aliens, it is, at first blush, an astonishing one. To make it
a Constitutional command is even more astonishing.
Because the Court can only deal with problems in a
piecemeal manner, it must reconsider the basic problem again
and again. We can anticipate one alien case after another as
litigants force the Courttodefinethelimitsofthe Plylerdecision.
Consequently, the Court keeps controversy boiling. The
Court's school integration decisions illustrate my point from
yet another perspective. The Court sank into a quagmire once
it moved from its principled position that publicly enforced
segregation violated the equal protection clause27 to its pragmatic position that the equal protection clause required integrated schools. 8 Having decided that schools must be racial
microcosms of the larger community, the Court assumed responsibility for insuring that result. Quotas and busing-and
controversy-followed. Today in many school districts the local federal judge is the de facto superintendant of schools. He
may also be the de facto warden of the prison, the de facto
chief of police, and the de facto director of welfare services.
By seizing the reins of government in the guise of construing
the Constitution, judges embroil courts in endless controversy.
And the Supreme Court itself must constantly reassess how
stringently or flexibly these Renaissance despots must apply
its remedial guidelines.
A court, unlike the legislature, cannot easily put a problem behind it and move on to other concerns. In part, of
course, that is because the Court has less control over its
docket than Congress has over its legislative agenda. More importantly, the legislature can put a problem behind because it
can fashion comprehensive solutions. The Court is much
praised for its protection of civil rights. In fact, significant
27. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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progress was made only after Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act and, later, other anti-discrimination legislation. In these
acts the Congress could deal with the whole range of discrimination practices and regulate them in relation to each other.2 9
Moreover, legislative acts are durable because they
emerge from the extended public debate that characterizes
the political process. Although we often become impatient
with the political process because it works so slowly, its very
slowness guarantees public acceptance of its final decision. If
we seek a quick fix from the Court, we will find ourselves, just
like the addict, needing yet another fix and another to get us
through successive crises. James Bradley Thayer counseled
against the ready resort to c'urts to solve our problems for
just that reason. He said:
[T]he exercise of [the power of judicial review], even
when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil,
namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come
from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors....
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great
function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. 0
Peril #3: Sacrifice. Judicial statesmen may sacrifice the
rights of the individual to promote the common good. This is
an especially troubling peril because the Supreme Court's one
special function is the protection of individual liberty. Justice
Jackson explained:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
court. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly ...
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
29. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1976).

30. J. THAYER,

JOHN MARSHALL

106-07 (1901).
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Yet statesmen cannot recognize any right whose enforcement
will unduly offend the community or impede the implementation of some much desired policy.
The history of the Court is sadly replete with "statesmanlike" sacrifices of the individual. The most egregious is the
Dred Scott decision. 2 There the Court, in the naive belief
that it could forestall civil war, declared that black men had
no rights which white men need respect. Dred Scott was
hardly the first sacrifice. One can read Marshall's famous
opinion in Marbury v. Madison,33 for example, as a callous
sacrifice of Marbury's right to his commission. Denying Marbury's claim enabled the Court to assert its power of judicial
review in a way not easily challenged by the Jeffersonians, and
Marshall seized the opportunity. Dred Scott was certainly not
the last sacrifice. During World War II, judicial statesmen
sustained the confinement of American citizens in relocation
centers for no reason other than that those citizens had yellow
skin and slanted eyes. Even more recently, judicial statesmen
sustained investigative witchhunts into the associational
rights of those whose left wing political views made them attractive scapegoats. I would not deny that the Court has occasionally shielded some hapless dissenter from' persecution. On
the whole, however, I think the Court's record in this respect
is exaggerated. Fourth of July oratory cannot conceal the fact
that judicial statesmen who decide cases on the basis of pragmatic predictions about what the community will tolerate
threaten our civil liberties.
Peril #4: Subversion. Far more serious than any of the
preceding perils is the last peril of judicial statesmanship: that
the Court will subvert the rule of law. The founding fathers
understood Lord Acton's dictum: power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.8 ' Consequently, they realized
that liberty would flourish only under a government of laws,
where people were controlled by certain, constant, and uni31.
32.
33.
34.

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Letter to Bishop Mandel Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), reprinted in L. AcroN,
ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND PoWER 328 (1955).
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form laws rather than by the arbitrary, uncertain and inconstant wills of public officials. The rule of law ultimately depends at some point, however, on the rule of men. In our
country the rule of law depends upon the ability of life-tenured judges to apply those principles of law embodied in the
Constitution fairly and objectively.
Judges who look backward for guidance will more likely
apply those principles fairly and objectively than will judges
who look forward for inspiration. Of course, the judicial
craftsman must guard against his biases and prejudices in the
selection and interpretation of those legal principles with
which he decides the dispute. But their very rootedness in the
Constitution and in our subsequent historical experience
greatly reduces the risk that his biases and prejudices will distort his reasoning. On the other hand, the biases and
prejudices of the judicial statesman must necessarily influence
his decision, for his judgment rests on no fixed moorings but
rather on evanescent notions of public policy.
Roe v. Wade,as the abortion decision, is illustrative. In
that case the Court held that states could not generally prohibit abortions. Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the Court,
conceded at the outset that people differed deeply about the
extent to which abortion should be permitted, if at all, that
one's view on the question was influenced by her moral values,
and that any resolution of the question necessarily involved
judgments about many other related issues. In our system
such complicated questions are resolved in the political process, and the courts must respect and enforce any legislative
resolution that does not violate the Constitution. It thus
should not have surprised any of the Justices that the Constitution provided no guidance on the abortion question because
it was never intended to provide such guidance. Legislators
who daily decide myriad questions of public policy must look
to sources other than the Constitution for guidance. They are
free to fashion whatever solution commends itself to their collective judgment as long as the solution does not violate the
Constitution.
Instead of concluding that the Court should therefore de35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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fer to the legislative judgment that a woman could not obtain
an abortion except in the most unusual circumstances, Justice
Powell36 allegedly concluded that he would have to vote his
"gut." Since he thought that the abortion laws were "atrocious," he would vote to invalidate them if he could find rationale. If the Justice meant only that he would insist on some
rationale that might reasonably be derived from Constitutional text, precedent, or history, his position might be defensible. Unfortunately, however, he had already concluded that
the search for a Constitutional rationale would be futile. He
was, then, looking not so much for a rationale as a rationalization. In other words, he wanted to conceal the real ground of
decisions-his personal belief that the abortion laws were
atrocious-with some clever legal rhetoric.
It is especially troubling that the Justice who is most consistently described as an apostle of judicial restraint should so
easily assume the role of statesman. Elsewhere, of course, Justice Powell has assured us that he understands that judges
make law and that the belief that the Constitution and laws
cabin his discretion is a quaint myth. The Justice learns
quickly. He had initially thought otherwise. In the death penalty cases, Powell thought that the soundness of his legal argument would persuade his colleagues that the Constitution
did not forbid capital punishment." But justices who cheerfully embrace the role of statesmen care little about the mere
soundness of legal argument. They care only about the result.
Thus Justice Marshall, ever alert to the problems of the poor,
especially the black poor, objected to an early draft of the
abortion opinion which did not make viability the determinative criterion because he feared states could "effectively ban
abortions in the [second trimester] under the guise of protecting the woman's health." 8 Marshall apparently believed that
the viability test would "better protect the rural poor."3
Of course the Justice may have been right as a matter of
public policy that the poor should be able to obtain abortions
as easily as the rich. Additionally, he may have balanced the
36.
37.
38.
39.

B. WOODWARD & S.
Id. at 212-15.
Id. at 232.
Id.

ARMSTRONG,

supra note 13, at 230.

HeinOnline -- 7 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 413 1982

414

Oklahoma City University Law Review

[Vol. VII

equities so sensitively and fairly that he qualifies as a statesman. The rub is that he took an oath to judge cases according
to the Constitution, and one searches its text in vain for an
indication that viability is the constitutional test for determining when a state may prohibit abortions. As in Miranda v.
Arizona,'0 where the Court extrapolated from the guarantee
against self-incrimination a detailed code regulating police interrogation of criminal suspects, the Court in Roe v. Wade extrapolated from the right to privacy a detailed code regulating
abortions. Under this constitutionally dictated scheme, the
.state may not prohibit abortions during the first trimester. It
may regulate them during the second trimester only to protect
the mother's health. In the last trimester, it may prohibit
them. That the right to privacy is nowhere mentioned in the
Constitution does not preclude the Court from recognizing it
as one of those ninth amendment rights retained by the people, but it does underscore the obvious fact that the Court
would have to demonstrate that the right to privacy embraced
the right to abortion on demand. Whether Justice Blackmun's
review of historical practices in Rome, Greece, and seventeenth century England proves that line of thought is, to say
the least, doubtful. Certain it is that he could not have argued
that abortion on demand reflected the evolving traditions of
the American people, the standard usually invoked when text
and history fail. At the time Roe v. Wade was decided, all fifty
states prohibited abortions. That fact alone might have given
craftsmen some pause, but it would not trouble statesmen
who thought that the community would nevertheless accept
their decision. Indeed, pragmatic prediction of that kind is
part of the statesman's art. Justice Stewart, for one, had allegedly concluded that "[t]he public was ready for abortion
1
reform."'
Typically, the Judges do not admit that they act as
statesmen rather than craftsmen. With a disingenuousness all
too characteristic of the Court's recent work product, Justice
Blackmun piously began his Roe v. Wade opinion:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitu40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. B. WOODWARD & S.

AEMSTRONG,

supra note 13, at 167.
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tional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection ....
We bear in mind,too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition [that
the Constitution] "is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States.4
Contrary to his assertion, Justice Blackmun did not decide the case on the basis of constitutional text, tradition, or
principle. The first draft of his opinion "did not settle on any
analytical framework [and did not] explain on what basis [he]
had arrived at the apparent conclusion that women had a
right to privacy, and thus a right to abortion. 4 3 Whatever
their personal reasons for favoring the result (Justice Stewart
was said to have concluded that abortion was a reasonable solution to the population problem!),"' the Justices seized almost as an afterthought upon the conveniently vague right to
privacy as a justification for their decision. The but-recentlyinto the Constidiscovered right had apparently been written
tution in invisible ink discernable only to the eye of judicial
statesmen like Justice Douglas, who had first reported discovering it in Griswold v. Connecticut." Douglas was pleased
that "[tihe right to privacy was being given constitutional
foundation in a major opinion."' 6 One would have thought
that the document rather than the Court gave a particular
right its constitutional foundation, but that is perhaps a mere
technicality that troubles only judges who take too narrow-i.e., unstatesmanlike-a view of their responsibilities.
In truth, facts rather than constitutional principles or tradition proved decisive. Justice Blackmun, having closeted
himself in the library of the Mayo Clinic during the Court's
summer recess, decided that abortions could be performed
safely. Mr. Justice Powell, who also devoted his summer re42. 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973) (quoting from Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 67 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
43. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 13, at 183.

44. Id. at 167.
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 13,at 235.
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cess to a study of the abortion problem, decided that medically performed abortions were better than "unsanitary
butchers and coat-hanger abortions.

'47

Both conclusions seem

eminently reasonable, but the question the Justices never
seemed to have asked themselves was whether those facts
were constitutionally relevant. While such facts might well
convince a legislature to adopt an abortion statute much like
the one imposed by the Court, they do not by themselves establish the existence of a constitutional right to abortion. The
Court simply cannot assume that its conception of sound social policy is embodied in the Constitution.
That almost all Justices have acted, at least on occasion,
as statesmen does not justify the practice, though it may be
thought to render any protest against the practice futile, if
not naive. If the Justice's perception of his role affects the
way in which he decides cases, however, the protest is neither
futile nor naive. A Justice who believes that he is obliged to
decide cases in conformity with the Constitution will often
reach a-different result from a Justice who believes that he is
free to decide cases in conformity with prevailing notions of
sound public policy. A Judge who sees his job as the resolution of the dispute before him will often reach a different result from the Judge who sees his job as the resolution of some
broader societal problem.
However much statesmen may be needed in public life, a
Justice who faithfully discharges his responsibilities cannot
satisfy that need. Courts were designed to serve very important but narrow purposes. The Framers expected the Supreme
Court occasionally to apply the brakes to public action. A
Court that says "no" to us makes us give our conduct a sober
second thought. Such a Court acts as our conscience. The
Framers never expected the Court to spur public action. A
Court that tells us "you must" leaves us no choice. Such a
Court acts as a council of Platonic Guardians.
Like the late Judge Hand, I would not choose to be governed by a bevy of Platonic Guardians even if I knew how to
choose them. I certainly would not leave their choice to the
likes of Johnson, Nixon, Carter, or Reagan. The present Court
47. Id. at 230.
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may not consider itself a council of Platonic Guardians. But
its Justices do see themselves as statesmen. The prospect is
thus not bright that the present Court will help maintain here
what has so rarely survived anywhere-a government of laws
rather than of men. For they have done what 'tis not fit for
any judge to do. They have imposed the statesman's will
rather than exercised the craftsman's reason.
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